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effectiveness which I have found surprising. And I gladly report that it is the
best little book in a big field of which I know. It is probably ungracious to
ask for more than the author has planned.
CHARLES E.

CLARKf
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QUANTITATIVE

SEMANTICS.

The goddess of justice may be blind, but she is certainly not mute. Indeed, the complaint has often been lodged against her that she talks too much,
and (it .has been insinuated) she says too little. She might even be called
the garrulous goddess.
It is not recorded who lodged the first charge of verbosity against the
garrulous goddess, but there are records of some eminent and telling criticisms
of her language, or anyway that of her disciples. The history of real criticism
in this field begins, appropriately enough, in 1776. In that year Jeremy
Bentham (A Fragmenton Government; etc.,) derided the stuffy conservatism
of Blackstone and the other conventional legal writers by gibing that "the
commonplace retinue of phrases," Justice, Right, Reason, the Law of Nature,
"are but so many ways of intimating that a man is firmly persuaded of the
truth of this or that moral proposition, though he either thinks he need not, or
finds he can't, tell why." We must distinguish, he said, between things and
names; "all else is but womanish scolding and childish altercation, which is
sure to irritate, and which never can persuade. . .. "
Although influential in some other respects, Bentham did not have much
immediate effect on that branch of legal thinking which modem scholars
would call "legal semantics." It was a century later that the commonplace
retinue of legal phrases and concepts was brilliantly satirized by Rudolph von
Jhering, a German professor of law, in his Heaven of Juristic Concepts.
About the same time our own Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., was beginning to
attack the formal verbalisms of traditional legal thinking with keen realistic
analysis. In 1913 he told a meeting of the Harvard Law School Association
of New York, "If I ffiay ride a hobby for an instant;-Ish6uld saywe need to
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
* Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
** Professor of Law, Yale University School of Law.
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think things instead of words . . ." Since Holmes, there has been a certain
amount of critical examination of legal language, or symbolism, chiefly in
the writings of the so-called "legal realists," but most of this has been largely
incidental to the consideration of other matters.
If the practitioners in any field are completely dependent upon words it
is in the field of law. It is difficult to think of any other profession in which
there is not some working with tangibles, some operational definitions. But
not so in law. Everything here depends upon the verbal formula. Whether
the words, written or spoken, of two parties are or are not called "a contract"
decides a lawsuit. Whether an act is called "negligent," or "malicious," or
"intentional," decides the fate of a man. Always it is the name which is given
to the event that is important in the law.
Some of the details and effects of this dependence upon verbalization
are suggested in Justice Vanderbilt's book Men and Measures in the Law.
Justice Vanderbilt does not explicitly relate his discussion to this aspect of
the subject, but his facts and analysis tell their own story.
His book is divided into three topical divisions. The first two chapters
are concerned with "Taking Inventory" of the law. The third chapter considers "The Growth of Substantive Law"; and the last two chapters discuss
"Procedure-The Stumbling Block."
I In his inventory, Justice Vanderbilt notes that in the time of Bacon and
Coke there were, in all, about 5,000 reported English cases. The number had
doubled by 1775; increased a hundredfold by 1890; and by 1940 had reached
1,750,000. Today the largest law library has 600,000 volumes, arida good working bar library requires 20,000 volumes. Similarly, in an average biennium,
Congress and the state legislatures pass over 50,000 pages of legislation to
supplement the more than quarter of a million pages of legislation already
making up our statute books! Add to this the mass of administrative regulations, and the charge of verbosity seems-proved against the garrulous goddess.
Even worse, says Justice Vanderbilt, than the mere mass of material which
comprises the corpus juris, is "the unknowability of its vast wilderness."
There is no general system of classification of statutes, and not even any
general digest or encyclopedia of statutory or administrative law. There are
digests of decisions, but the scholar who attempts to apply law review
standards of research to the ordinary problems arising in the practice of law
(which presumably are the objects of primary concern) will quickly reach
a definite and unflattering conclusion as to the adequacy of the digest systems.
The great stumbling block to progress in the law, Justice Vanderbilt
believes, is procedure. By this, however, he does not mean the limited number
of technical rules usually comprehended in that term. By procedure he means
what might be called methodology. "The truth is," he says, "that we need a
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new concept of procedure. At the same time that we are simplifying and
rationalizing our rules of pleading and practice, we need to acquire the point
of view that procedure comprehends everything which the lawyer has to do
with a case from the moment that he is brought into it." Earlier Justice
Vanderbilt makes it plain that such an improved methodology for law must
include a new and more precise terminology.
Beyond this Justice Vanderbilt does not go. In this thin volume he
principally measures the failures of the professional men in the law, and
suggests the need for improvement. He does not particularly emphasize the
importance of an analysis of terminology in achieving progress; indeed, it is
not clear that he is fully aware of the importance of this problem. His book
is an interesting and stimulating summary of the views of a mature, moderate
and intelligent legal mind. It is certainly not revolutionary in its implications,
nor even radical. Yet it is plain from his analysis that some way must be
found for dealing with the flood of words that threatens to engulf all legal
thinking if the lawyers are ever to be able to swim upstream to higher
intellectual ground.
Anyone aware of this problem should be delighted to find a book entitled
Language and the Law: The Semantics of Forensic English, especially when
the author casually refers to building on the work of Ogden and Richards
(The Meaning of Meaning) and Holmes. Unfortunately the delight is rudely
disappointed by Philbrick's book. It is true that it deals with semantics, of
a kind and to a degree. But his observations on legal semantics can be
summed up in a single sentence: To persuade a jury, use terms with favorable
emotional connotations in referring to aspects of your own case, and terms of
unfavorable emotional connotations in referring to your opponent's case.
Furthermore, there can be little doubt as to just how literally he means this
advice to be taken. The book throughout is little more than a collection of
illustrations and anecdotes of particular cases (mostly criminal trials) in
which one or another appeal to sentiment was more or less successful in moving a jury. One of his earliest illustrations tells how the lawyers secured the
acquittal of the lynchers of Willie Earle, a young Southern negro, without
going to the trouble of presenting any testimony. In the closing arguments
the corpus delicti "was commonly referred to as a dead nigger or a dead
nigger boy, and there was a strong suggesti'on that the law was unreasonable
in taking note of the death of so insignificant a creature." The author comments, "The closing arguments of these lawyers, which occupied several hours,
are instructive examples for study. They must have been effective, for all
the defendants were acquitted by the jury."
This book bears about the same relation to semantics that a book on seduction, or a collection of "French art photos," would bear to physiology. If
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it is semantics, it is the semantics of the carnival barker and the sideshow
shill. We do not need more instruction on how to subvert, but on how to
improve the administration of justice. Vanderbilt would most certainly not
consider Philbrick's book a contribution to that improvement in legal methodology which is so urgently needed.
At nearly the opposite pole in the manner of its approach to the use of
words is Dr. Lasswell's book, Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative
Semantics. This book is actually a collection of papers, edited by Dr. Lasswell.
The papers are concerned with what may be more familiarly known to readers
as "content analysis." This consists of establishing analytical categories for
application to particular kinds of subject matter by "validating" these categories by the judgment of a representative group of experts. The subject
matter is then analyzed by tabulating the frequency of the occurrence of
symbols falling within the various categories, the tabulations also being made
by groups of experts. The results are expressible in precise quantitative
terms, and are subject to all the mathematical tests for reliability, dispersion
and central tendency which modern statistical methods have developed.
Regardless of whether or not the intelligent reader is aware of all the
technical implications of the mathematical formulae, he can hardly fail to be
impressed with the scientific objectivity of the method. Beyond this, even
a reader to whom the multiplication table is a hopeless maze can understand
the general conclusions and the possibilities of the technique. The principal
studies included in the book consist of analyses of nazi and communist propaganda. One application of the studies was their use in the trial of alleged
foreign agents. The testimony of Dr. Lasswell, and the results of his scientific content analysis, were admitted in evidence by the courts as part of the
proof that certain publications were actually nazi propaganda vehicles, and
not independent publications, as they claimed .
Other studies included in the book consist of content analyses of slogans
used by the Communist Party and the Comintern during the period from
1918 to 1943. The changes in emphasis and direction of propaganda effort
are traced, not in broad outline, but in precise detail and with quantitative
measures.
The possibility of the application of this technique of analysis to judicial
decisions is too obvious to be overlooked. It is to be'hoped that some serious
studies along this line are undertaken soon. But, while this book indicates
potential techniques for dealing with difficult problems of legal terminology,
it is no more than suggestive. It is not directly concerned with, and it offers
no immediate answers to, any specific legal problems. Rather than criticism,
this simply means that however suggestive it may be, the book is not a direct
attack on the problems of legal semantics.
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However, it is a sorry reflection on the profession, and particularly on
the law schools, that no one has yet undertaken the scholarly and rigorous
examination of the terminological and conceptual foundations of law that is
so badly needed. Some aspects of the problem have -been considered in the
light of modern principles of psychology by Jerome Frank in 1930 (Law and
the Modern Mind) and by E. S. Robinson (Law and the Lawyers) and
Thurman Arnold (The Symbols of Government) in 1935. Yet it is significant
that in the most recent and most pretentious collection of essays on legal
philosophy yet made, of thirty-eight eminent legal scholars not a single one
thought it worthwhile to consider the operating concepts of law. One of the
contributors to the massive Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies,
Professor Stone of Sydney, Australia, did indeed consider the application of
legal concepts to specific cases in a general way. The rest of the contributors
were almost wholly concerned with such airy legal abstractions as "natural
law," "positive law," "justice and expediency," "juridical values," and other
similar emotional slogans. Comparing the language used by "modern legal
philosophers" with the Communist Party slogans analyzed by Dr. Lasswell's
associates suggests that the legal philosophers are more elegant in their choice
of words, less practical in their choice of subjects, and about equal to the
Communist Party leadership in the relative balance of intellectual content
and emotional appeal.
Why the law should be thus lacking in the kind of analytical thinking
which has proved so productive in other fields is a puzzling problem. Perhaps
it is simply an inexplicable aspect of the general phenomenon known as
"cultural lag." In any event, it would seem that the law schools must bear
much of the responsibility both for the present and the future generations of
practicing lawyers and teachers. So far as I am aware, no American law
school has a course in semantics, either required or optional. (To mention
only a few of the excellent texts available, there are the seminal Ogden and
Richards, The Meaning of Meaning; Stuart Chase, The Tyranny of Words;
S. I. Hayakawa, Language in Action, and his recent book, Language, Thought
and Action; Charles Morris, Signs, Language and Behaviour; and, the most
difficult and rigorous, Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity.)
The only tools that a lawyer has are words, and to give him these tools
without warning him of the difficulties and dangers in the use of all such
symbolic tools is something like teaching a medical student surgery without
mentioning antisepsis or asepsis. Analysis is hindered rather than helped by
attaching emotional labels. However, the reader who is interested in value
judgments will readily enough think of the effective terms in which to describe
a medical school which would graduate doctors taught to use scalpels on
patients without sterilization.
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The three books under review epitomize, in a way, the present situation.
justice Vanderbilt recognizes the need for radical improvements in legal
procedure and at least intimates that new techniques for dealing with our
terminology must constitute a fundamental part of any important improvement. Mr. Philbrick illustrates the preoccupation with trial-success that
characterizes our law schools today to the exclusion of their more important
functions. Professor Lasswell suggests some new approaches and techniques
that might very well be adapted to the problems of legal semantics. Unfortunately the problems remain virtually untouched. The garrulous goddess
continues to babble without a competent interpreter.
LEE LOEv NGERt
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, by Geoffrey Chevalier Cheshire.*
gow: Jackson, Son & Company, 1948. Pp. 90. 6s.

Glas-

Because International Contracts is in fact a lecture delivered before a
diversified audience at the University of Glasgow, it might be supposed that
the work is merely a popularization of well-known legal principles. Such is
most certainly not the case. In the preface to the third edition of his standard
work on English conflict of laws, Professor Cheshire expressed dissatisfaction
with the treatment given therein to the contract conflicts law.' This lucid and
brilliantly written lecture is Professor Cheshire's attempt to amend and reanalyze certain topics in this area.
According to the 19th century English scholar Westlake, the "proper
law" of the contract (the law which governs a contract generally) is the law
of that country with which the contract has "the most real connection." 2
However, English opinions have consistently stated that the proper law of
the contract is that law which the parties intend to apply. In most cases these
different theories will lead to the same result. If the parties have expressed
no intention as to governing law, an intention will be presumed in "the light
of the subject matter and of the surrounding circumstances."' The presumption will normally select the law of that country which is most substantially
connected with the contract. But when the parties have expressly agreed to
be bound by the law of a country having no or perhaps only a slight factual
connection with the transaction the theories may lead to practical differences.
Professor Cheshire launches a heavy attack on the intention of the parties rule
if that rule is interpreted to mean that the parties are permitted an unrestricted
t Member, Minneapolis Bar.
*Vinerian Professor of English Law, University of Oxford; Fellow
Master of the Bench of Lincoln's Inn.
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